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1. Introduction 
A medical witness is supposed to be an independent expert whose specialised knowledge, skill, 
training, and possibly experience, may assist the court—the judge and jury—in determining the 
issue of liability. Writing at the turn of the 19th century on the ethics of court testimony in cases 
of infanticide, Thomas Percival advised medical practitioners in his Medical Ethics: 
when it becomes their painful office to deliver evidence, on such occasions, justice and humanity 
require, that they should scrutinize the whole truth, and nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in 
malice. [emphasis in original]1 
This article examines social and medicolegal developments, which have contributed to the 
evolution of medical and forensic culture in the mid-19th-century England, whereby the ideal of a 
nonpartisan expert witness would often be honoured more in the breach than in practice. There 
has been considerable body of literature relating to medical witnesses who appeared in criminal 
 
1 T. Percival, Medical Ethics (1803). Reproduced in Classics of Medicine Library, Birmingham (1985), Chapter IV, 
Article II, at 81-2. This work, titled Medical Jurisprudence, was privately printed and circulated by Percival in 1794. 
 
* Tel.: +61-395-090-708; fax: +61-395-000-095. 
E-mail address: dmendel@deakin.edu.au (D. Mendelson). 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 
 
25 (2002) 304 
 
cases;2 this article, however, analyses legal and medical responses to the dramatic upsurge in civil 
compensation claims for personal injuries occasioned through railway accidents. It looks back to 
a time before psychiatry became recognised as a discrete branch of medicine, and surgeons as 
well as physicians treated patients whose condition would today be diagnosed as a severe 
psychiatric reaction to a traumatic event.3 
 
Fierce medical debates of the 1860s regarding the aetiology of somatic symptoms presented by 
railway passengers who were involved in train collisions but did not sustain a demonstrable 
physical injury engendered their own highly emotive vocabulary. Partisan opinions held by 
medical witnesses adhering to a particular viewpoint or theory found their way into the courtroom 
and were reported in a series of high-profile cases. The article examines the state of medical 
knowledge as reflected in the medical controversy that exploded on the pages of The Lancet. This 
journal, founded by Thomas Wakley in 1823, was at the forefront of legal, ethical, and 
educational reform of the medical profession in England. The medical background illuminates the 
law of compensation for pure psychiatric injury as it developed in the second part of the 19th 
century. 
 
The essay is a study on how perceptions of the role of a medical expert can impact professional 
practice, how perceptions of the nature of a particular disorder can influence the attitudes of 
individual doctors towards patients who present with the condition, and finally, how perceptions 
created by medical nomenclature regarding the status of a disorder can shape the development of 
the law. 
 
2. The dubious practice of ‘medical arbitration’ 
 
The advent of railways in the early 1830s brought in its wake an unprecedented toll of injuries 
and death.4 The injured passengers tended to sue the railway companies as 
 
2 A. Rosenberg, ‘The Sarah Stout Murder Case: An Early Example of the Doctor as an Expert Witness’ in C.R. 
Burns (Ed.), Legacies in Law and Medicine, New York: Science History Publications (1977) 228–238; J.P. Eigen and 
G. Andoll ‘From Mad-Doctors to Forensic Witness: The Evolution of Early English Court Psychiatry’ (1986) 9 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 159–169; J.C. Mohr, Doctors and the Law, New York: Oxford University 
Press (1993); C. Crawford, ‘Legalizing Medicine: Early Modern Legal Systems and the Growth of Medico-Legal 
Knowledge’ in M. Clark & C. Crawford, Legal Medicine in History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1994) 
89–117; S. Landsman ‘One Hundred Years of Rectitude: Medical Witnesses at the Old Bailey, 1717–1817’ (1998) 16 
Law and History Review 445–494. 
3 My interest in this area of the law was sparked by my husband, Professor George Mendelson, who 
introduced me to medical writings on ‘railway injuries’ (as they were called in the mid-19th century), when we 
coauthored a paper titled ‘Tortious Liability for Nervous Shock’ (February 1991). See also D. Mendelson, ‘The 
Defendants’ Liability for Negligently Caused Nervous Shock in Australia—Quo Vadis?’ (1992) 18 Monash Law 
Review 16–70. 
4 According to A. Moore, A Hand-Book of Railway Law, London: W.H. Smith & Son (1859), at p. xxxii, the 1857 
Annual Report of the Board of Trade stated that out of nearly 140 million passengers who travelled by United Kingdom 
railways in that year, 236 were killed and 738 were injured ‘from causes beyond their own control’. 
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common carriers in action on the case in tort rather than in contract. This tendency was reinforced 
by the decision in Hadley v. Baxendale,5 which determined that in ordinary commercial 
transactions, recovery was only allowed for damage that ‘may reasonably be supposed to have 
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable 
result of the breach of it’. This meant that compensation for any secondary symptoms caused by 
the breach of contract was excluded.6 Consequently, in cases of vehicular collisions—where the 
injury arose from the negligent conduct of the defendant carrier—the plaintiff was able to obtain 
more adequate damages in an action on the case for negligence. This cause of action was also the 
most appropriate, for as J. Bayley in Ansell v. Waterhouse7 stated: 
actions on the case lie for recovery of damages for consequential wrongs, accruing from 
misfeasance or nonfeasance, from negligence or wilful conduct of the party sued, in doing or 
omitting to do something, contrary to the duty which the law casts upon him [the common carrier] 
in a particular case. 
Railway companies were classified as falling into the category of common carriers.8 They were 
thus responsible for any physical injury to the passengers that occurred as a direct result of their 
negligence. In England and in the United States, passenger carriers of all kinds were held to a 
standard of utmost care and, providing there was no contributory negligence on the part of the 
claimant,9 were often found liable for damages in an action on the case. For example, in 1865 the 
railway companies paid out over £300,000 in damages to injured passengers.10 There appear to be 
no reported cases in which mid-19th-century plaintiffs suing a railway company pleaded damage 
in the form of such traditional psychiatric conditions as mental alienation11 or insanity (mania, 
melancholia or monomania, dementia, lunacy, or idiocy). Instead, plaintiffs alleged that they 
suffered conditions, which today would be considered psychosomatic and posttraumatic 
disorders. 
 
Casualties on railways were so high that all major English railway companies employed their own 
teams of surgeons and physicians. As a result, from the middle of the 19th century, medical 
practitioners became very closely involved with forensic processes in the context of the law of 
compensation. The interaction between law and medicine was not without 
 
5 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341, at 354, per Alderson B. 
6 Other than breach of promise of marriage. See Pollock C.B. in Hamlin v. Great Northern Railway Company (1856) 1 
H&N 408, at 411; 156 ER 1261, at 1262. 
7 Ansell v. Waterhouse (1817) 105 ER 1286. The case concerned the plaintiff’s wife who was injured while a passenger 
in a common stagecoach. 
8 Railway and Land Traffic Carriers’ Act (An Act for the Better Regulation of the Traffic on Railways and Canals) 
1854 (UK), 17 and 18 Vict ch 31. 
9 From the 1809 case of Butterfield v. Forrester (1809) 11 East 60; 103 ER 926 until modified by the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK) (followed in other common law jurisdictions later), a successful plea of 
contributory negligence had the effect of defeating the plaintiff’s recovery entirely. 
10 D. Mendelson, Interfaces of Medicine and Law: The Liability for Negligently Caused Psychiatric Injury (Nervous 
Shock), Ashgate International Publishing (Dartmouth Medico-Legal Series) (1998), at 36. 
11 Term introduced by Philippe Pinel (1745–1826). 
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professional and ethical dilemmas, particularly in relation to the role of medical witnesses in 
personal injury litigation occasioned by railway accidents. 
 
The primary function of railway surgeons and physicians was, naturally, to treat passengers and 
railway employees injured in train accidents.12 They would also appear as expert witnesses in any 
legal proceedings arising out of these accidents. More controversially, however, from the middle 
of the 1840s, many railway medical officers acted for their respective employers in arranging the 
amount of compensation that their employer-company would pay to the injured patients. Having 
diagnosed the patient’s injury, they would then offer him or her an amount in compensation on 
behalf of the negligent railway company for whom they acted. 
 
This widespread practice of ‘medical arbitration’ was criticised in The Lancet. The editorial of 7 
July 1866,13 having referred to two ‘recent cases’, stated that a medical practitioner employed by 
a railway company: 
should never, if attending the patient on behalf of the company, discuss the amount of 
compensation with the patient alone; for the paid officer of a company ‘arbitrates’, if acting alone, 
under suspicion—a suspicion dangerous to his character and derogatory to his professional 
honour. He should require the presence of a medical man on behalf of the patient, and the patient, 
so protected, may then consider the question. To attend the patient on behalf of the company, and 
settle with him without any impartial medical intervention, is a position which he ought not for a 
moment to accept, for both his own sake and that of his profession.14 
The Lancet concluded that settling the amount of damages was both a legitimate and beneficial 
exertion of professional duty by a medical practitioner, providing the patient had the benefit of 
independent medical advice. 
 
Some patients did not see the matter in quite the same benign light, and sued their ‘medical 
arbitrators’ for damages. For example, in August 1866, The Lancet reported the case of Cooper v. 
London & North-Western Railway Company.15 On 29 September 1865, Miss Cooper, a passenger 
on the defendant’s train was injured as a result of its negligence. She was taken to a nearby 
tavern, called Carven Arms, where Dr. Hughes attended her. He ‘subsequently gave her £20 from 
the company, for which she signed a receipt’. Her injuries turned out to be much more serious 
than Dr. Hughes’ diagnosis suggested, and despite the ‘settlement’, she sued for damages. The 
judge strongly condemned Dr. Hughes’ conduct and 
 
12 No statistics were collated for members of the general public who died or were injured in railway collisions and 
accidents. However, they must have been very high, if only because although railway companies were granted a 
privilege to bisect districts, cross thoroughfares, and intersect the course of footpaths, until the 1860s they were not 
compelled by law to make such level crossings safe. Anonymous, ‘Railway Crossings’, The Law Times, 28 September 
1867, 369–70. 
13 Anonymous, ‘Medical Arbitration’, The Lancet, 7 July 1866, at 16–17. 
14 Id., at 16. 
15 Cooper v. London & North-Western Railway Company (unreported, Oxford Circuit, Stafford, 27 July 1866, before 
Keating J. and a special jury). Digested in The Lancet, 4 August 1866, at 138. 
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the jury awarded her £100 in damages, while expressing their disapprobation of the ‘medical 
arbitration’ practice.16 
 
The Lancet editorial of 7 July 1866 did not explain why the practice of ‘medical arbitration’ 
placed the medical practitioner’s character under a dangerous ‘suspicion’ and derogated from his 
professional honour. The implication was that by serving two masters—the injured patient and 
the railway company, who was the injurer—medical practitioners placed themselves in a position 
of professional conflict of interest. Moreover, unless they disclosed their position as servants of 
the railway company, medical practitioners were liable for misrepresentation, fraud, and, 
possibly, breach of fiduciary obligations owed to the patient-client.17 Thus, in another unreported 
case decided in 1867,18 Mr. Acton, who was injured through the negligence of the Midland 
Railway Company, went to his family physician, Dr. Robertson, who told him that the injury was 
trifling and would be remedied in a fortnight by a change of air. On the strength of this advice, 
Mr. Acton accepted £31 and 10s in a private settlement, but soon found that his condition was 
much worse than he was led to believe by Dr. Robertson. Unbeknown to his patient, this 
physician also acted for the railway company.Mr. Acton decided to take his case to court, where 
the jury awarded him £1500. Chief Justice Cockburn of the Queen’s Bench was highly critical of 
physicians acting for both parties and said that ‘It is no part of the duty of a medical attendant to 
take part in settlements with patients’.19 
 
The case was digested in The Lancet and The Law Times. The Law Times report concluded that 
it was ‘in vain for railway companies to attempt to settle claims through a medical officer, who 
has it in his power to represent to a patient that his condition is not as bad as it really is’.20 In a 
subsequent ‘Letter to the Editor’ of The Lancet,21 Dr. Robertson wrote that when he first became 
a railway officer, he followed the example of his predecessor in negotiating settlements between 
injured patients and the negligent railway companies that employed him. He apparently 
abandoned this practice after becoming convinced of its impropriety. 
 
16 In Rideal v. Great Western Railway Company (1859) NP 1 F&F 706-7; 95 RR 967-8, in the course of a train 
collision, the plaintiff, a commercial traveller, suffered severe concussion and bruising. He spent the night at the nearest 
hotel, where the next day the stationmaster visited him and offered £20 in compensation. The plaintiff agreed and 
signed a receipt ‘in full satisfaction of injuries arising from the accident . . . and full consequences arising therefrom’. 
He sued the company when it transpired that he was unable to resume his avocation due to ‘a severe concussion of the 
spinal cord and of the brain’. In his charge to the jury, Earle J. approached the issue in the strictly contractual terms of 
the time, asking whether the plaintiff’s mind ‘went with those terms [of the settlement] and he understood their effect 
when he assented to them’. If he did, he was bound by the agreement and could recover no further compensation, even 
if at the time he ‘had no idea’ how serious and permanent his injuries were. The jury found for the defendant. By the 
1860s, however, cases of this kind were litigated in tort, rather than contract. 
17 The medical practitioner’s fiduciary obligations would flow from his or her handling of the patient’s monetary 
compensation claim. 
18 Acton v. Midland Railway Company (unreported, 1867, Court of Queen’s Bench). See Anonymous, ‘Compensation 
for Railway Injuries’, The Lancet 799–80; Anonymous, ‘Actions against Railway Companies’, The Law Times, vol. 
43, at 118. 
19 Id., The Law Times, at 118. 
20 Ibid. 
21 W.T. Robertson, ‘Acton v. the Midland Railway’, The Lancet, 6 July 1867, at 15. 
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As noted above, the July 1866 editorial on ‘medical arbitration’ also stated that, provided the 
patient’s own physician was present, settling the amount of damages was both a ‘legitimate and 
beneficial exertion of professional duty’ by the railway medical officers. The claims to 
beneficence and legitimacy were open to objections. Medically, the haste associated with medical 
arbitration meant that compensation was paid before the true extent of the injury, both physical 
and psychological, could be discovered and assessed.22 Yet, the issue of misdiagnosis in the 
context of medical arbitration was not discussed in the editorial. Ethically, the unequal power 
relationship between doctors and injured railway passengers meant that many arrangements with 
unrepresented patients did not provide them with just compensation. Finally, in law, ‘settlement’ 
of an action refers to the voluntary compromise or resolution of a claim by the parties to civil 
litigation. Legal settlements can be made at any stage of the proceedings before final judgment 
and are enforceable by the court,23 unless one of the parties has acted improperly. 
 
The 1867 case of Hand & Wife v. Midland Railway Company, abstracted in The Lancet24 
involved an allegation of impropriety and absence of bona fide by a surgeon, who was a party to 
the medical arbitration settlement. Mrs. Hand sustained injuries through the admitted negligence 
of the defendant railway company. Mr. Day, a surgeon to the defendant’s company, assured Mrs. 
Hand shortly after the accident that she would soon be well and gave her a cheque for £211 to 
remunerate her for loss of business and medical expenses. Her own medical practitioner 
witnessed the receipt given to Mrs. Hand. The latter deposed that he did not advise the patient to 
settle, but merely signed his name as a witness to the receipt, though, apparently, even at the time, 
he expressed doubts as to the period of her recovery. Subsequently, she became very ill and ‘was 
on the verge of paralysis’.25 She sued the surgeon, Mr. Day, for fraud and misrepresentation. The 
jury awarded her £300 in damages against the surgeon, in addition to the £211 already paid. The 
judge commented that ‘as a general rule, it was most objectionable that medical men should 
engage in making compromises. If such a compromise was to be made, it was better that it should 
be in the hands of the professional legal advisers than in those of medical men’.26 
 
Ethical issues relating to the patient–doctor relationship and the locus of professional duty 
became a major topic of articles and editorials in medical journals of the late 1840s.27 A 
 
22 The ‘once for all’ rule of compensation was articulated in Fetter v. Beal (1701) 1 Ld Raym 339, 692; 91 ER 1122. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Hand and Wife v. Midland Railway Company (1867) (unreported, Bristol County Court) digested in The Lancet, 24 
August 1867, at 243. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 The concern with low ethical standards of medical practice eventually led to the formation of such associations as the 
Manchester Medico-Ethical Association (1848) and the Medico-Ethical Committee of the British Medical Association 
(1853). See Anonymous, ‘Medical Ethics’ (1848) 2 British and Foreign Medico- Chirurgical Review 1–30 (the rather 
verbose article was published anonymously by Thomas Laycock). These concerns also led to the creation of ethical 
codes for medical conduct, modelled on Percival’s Medical Ethics (1803), the third edition of which was published in 
England in 1849. The American Medical Association adopted the Code of Medical Ethics in 1846–1847. 
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greater emphasis on adherence to ethical norms of professional conduct, together with a number 
of well-publicised cases, contributed to the decline of ‘medical arbitration’. However, not all 
medical practitioners were happy to abandon this practice. Dr. John Charles Hall, a Senior 
Physician to the Sheffield Public Hospital and Physician to the Midland Railway Company, wrote 
in 1875: 
So far as I know, railway companies are ever ready to deal with all who may have suffered, fairly 
and most liberally. How much, then, of pain, sorrow, and anxiety would be saved, if the claimants 
would at once grasp the friendly hand held out to them, instead of enduring for months the anguish 
inseparable from anticipation of the day on which they will have to appear as witnesses in a court 
of law: the trial over, then only to discover beyond doubt that, had they accepted the offer made to 
them, in every sense, pecuniary included, they would indeed have been gainers.28 
 
As the term ‘medical arbitration’ implies, doctors who were involved in it took on the role of 
advocates for one of the parties who were engaged in an essentially legal dispute about 
compensation for negligently occasioned injury. Though the practice eventually disappeared, it 
left a long-lasting legacy. Throughout the 19th century, doctors—including most of the 
contributors to the railway injuries debates—would continue to hold an office of a surgeon or 
physician to a railway company as part of their specialist practice. Though of itself the holding of 
such office presented no ethical or professional dilemmas, it became an issue in cases where its 
holders appeared as expert witnesses in court. The ethical position of such medical practitioners, 
who, having been involved in the patient’s treatment—on the witness stand effectively assumed 
the role of an advocate for the defendant railway companies—was not unlike that of railway 
surgeons who engaged in the practice of medical arbitration. In both cases, they failed to resolve 
professional conflict of interests. 
 
3. Medical controversies regarding the nature of railway injuries in the 1860s  
 
The great majority of passengers involved in railway collisions sustained demonstrable wounds 
and lesions, but some victims of these accidents suffered severely disabling symptoms that 
followed either a relatively minor or no apparent physical injury. The symptoms manifested by 
patients who were only slightly physically injured in railway accidents included extreme 
tenderness of skin, sensitivity to light, sleep disturbance, nominal dysphasia,29 mutism, stuttering, 
uncontrollable movements in limbs (choreas), and different forms of paralysis. The nature of 
these injuries and symptoms became a topic of medical as well as sociopolitical debate that 
continues to this day.30 
 
28 The British Medical Journal, 11 December 1875, 729–30. 
29 J.E. Erichsen, On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System, London: Walton & Maberly (1866), ‘Mr. J’s 
Case’, pp. 53–8. 
30 D. Mendelson, Interfaces of Medicine and Law: The Liability for Negligently Caused Psychiatric Injury (Nervous 
Shock), Ashgate International Publishing (Dartmouth Medico-Legal Series) (1998). 
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John Eric Erichsen, Holmer Professor of Surgery at University College Hospital London,31 
published a book called Railway Injuries, containing a series of lectures he delivered at the 
University College Hospital London in spring of 1866.32 In the book, he observed that severely 
disabling symptoms, which followed relatively minor accidental injury, had become ‘a most 
important branch of medico-legal investigation’33 when sustained as a result of railway collisions. 
At the same time, he argued that severe sequelae that followed trivial physical trauma were 
neither a new phenomenon created by the advent of railways,34 nor confined to persons involved 
in litigation.35 Erichsen was genuinely surprised that his views on the nature of these injuries, 
which eventually would acquire the appellation of ‘nervous shock’, were considered 
controversial.36 They were opposed on the pages of medical journals and books,37 and on the 
witness stand in court. The debate involved some of the most celebrated and respected medical 
practitioners of the 19th century. Among Erichsen’s supporters were Sir William Ferguson, who 
was a professor of Surgery at King’s College London,38 and Dr. Russell Reynolds, a Professor of 
Medicine at University College 
 
31 Sir John Eric Erichsen Baronet (1818–1896) was educated at University College London and then in Paris. In 1850, 
he became Holmer Professor of Surgery at University College Hospital London and eventually, the President of the 
Council of University College. By the time he published On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System, 
Erichsen was already well known and respected for The Science and Art of Surgery: A Treatise on Surgical Injuries, 
Diseases and Operations (1853), which appeared in 10 editions, and was translated into German, Italian, and Spanish. 
He became the 37th President of the Royal Society of Medicine (1879–1881), as well as the president of the College of 
Surgeons (1880). In 1887, Erichsen was appointed surgeon-extraordinary to Queen Victoria and created a Baronet. 
32 J.E. Erichsen, On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System, London: Walton & Maberly (1866). 
33 Id., at 2–3. 
34 Id., at 11. Erichsen used the case of Count de Lordat, which was first described by Dr. M. Maty, ‘A Palsy Occasioned 
by a Fall, Attended with Uncommon Symptoms’, Medical Observations and Inquiries, London: William Johnston 
(1767), vol. 3, at 257–74. See also D. Mendelson, Interfaces of Medicine and Law: The Liability for Negligently 
Caused Psychiatric Injury (Nervous Shock), Ashgate International Publishing (Dartmouth Medico-Legal Series) 
(1998), at 24–7. 
35 Erichsen described the case of Mrs. B., who in 1860, at the age of 32, slipped down four stairs. In the following 6 
years, her symptoms included various forms of numbness of arms, legs, and tongue (anaesthesia), astasia–abasia (an 
inability to stand straight and walk in a coordinated fashion), confusion of thought, loss of memory, bad appetite, and 
progressive paralysis. J.E. Erichsen, On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System, London: Walton & 
Maberly (1866), at 64–6. He also described the case of a 23-year-old man who fell from a horse, walked home, 
seemingly uninjured, but 6 weeks later developed a temporary paralysis with some residual impairment of function (id., 
at 86–9). 
36 D. Mendelson, Interfaces of Medicine and Law: The Liability for Negligently Caused Psychiatric Injury (Nervous 
Shock), Ashgate International Publishing (Dartmouth Medico-Legal Series) (1998), at 36–48. 
37 Id., at 40–8. 
38 Sir William Ferguson (1808–1877), a Fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons in Edinburgh, was at the time surgeon 
to the Prince Consort and, eventually, the Queen. He was the president of the Pathological Society (1859) and of the 
British Medical Association (1873). Ferguson was best known for the pioneering work in conservative surgery whereby 
surgeons were urged to consider all parts of the body as worthy of saving from amputation, and for his Progress of 
Anatomy and Surgery During the Present Century (1867). Sir James Paget called Ferguson ‘the greatest practical 
surgeon of our time’. A.J. Youngson, The Scientific Revolution in Victorian Medicine, Canberra: Australian National 
University Press (1979), at 228. 
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London.39 Erichsen’s most prominent opponent was James Syme, a Professor of Clinical Surgery 
at the University of Edinburgh.40 
 
The debate between Erichsen and Syme on the nature of railway injuries in the 1860s formed part 
of a complex pattern of change from pre-modern to modern medical understanding of illness and 
disorder. The doctrine developed by William Cullen41 in the 18th century that all normal and 
abnormal processes in the body were influenced by the nervous system was still very influential 
and it was accepted that ‘nervous power’ (also called ‘nervous energy’) was instrumental in 
transmission of physical sensations to the brain and of motor impulses to the muscles. The notion 
of ‘animal spirits’42 renamed as ‘nerve force’, ‘nervous power’,43 or ‘nervous energy’44 persisted 
throughout the 19th century. In the 1860s, though the importance of the brain function was 
acknowledged,45 less was known about the brain than about the anatomy and pathology of the 
spine and the autonomic nervous system. Consequently, although both the spine and brain were 
seen as the nerve 
 
39 Sir John Russell Reynolds 1st Baronet (1828–1896), MD, FRS was a Consultant Physician to the University College 
Hospital and Physician in Ordinary to the Queen Victoria’s Household. He was one of the founders of the National 
Hospital for the Paralyzed and Epileptic on London’s Queen Square (1860), the first specialised unit dealing with 
neurological disorders. He was well known for his works on The Diagnosis of Diseases of the Brain, Spinal Cord, 
Nerves, and Their Appendages, London: J. Churchill (1855) and A System of Medicine, which he edited, Philadelphia: 
H.C. Lea (1879–80). 
40 James Syme (1799–1870) was Surgeon to the Queen in Scotland. In his Excision of Diseased Joints (1831), Syme 
demonstrated that excision is usually preferable to amputation. This principle was further developed by William 
Ferguson. In 1867, Syme supported the antiseptic method of surgery introduced by his pupil and son-inlaw, Sir Joseph 
Lister (who studied under Erichsen in London before coming to Edinburgh. Erichsen was openly sceptical about 
antisepsis). Syme has been described as ‘one of the most celebrated surgeons of his day’ by J. Oppenheim, ‘Shattered 
Nerves’: Doctors, Patients, and Depression in Victorian England, New York: Oxford University Press (1991), at 60; 
and as ‘the litigious surgeon’ by M.A. Crowther, ‘Forensic Medicine and Medical Ethics in Britain’, in R. Baker (Ed.), 
The Codification of Medical Morality, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (1995), at 184. 
41 William Cullen (1710–1790) in his First Lines of the Practice of Physic (1777) suggested that disease was the result 
of disturbances in the nervous system. He identified neuroses as one of the four classes of disease (the other three being 
fevers, cachexias, and local disorders). According to Cullen, the characteristic feature of neuroses was the absence of 
structural or topical change in the body. The category included epilepsy, chorea, insanity, apoplexy, paraplegia, and 
syncope. 
42 This notion had its origins in the Galenian theory of pneumatic forces. Galen (130–c200 CE), an adherent of humoral 
medicine, defined human physiology in terms of fluids, solids, and three kinds of pneuma or spirits: ‘physical spirits’ 
that were derived from venous blood; ‘vital spirits’ that formed in the heart by the interaction of the breathed in air; and 
‘animal’ or ‘psychical spirits’ that regulated the brain, nerves, and feelings.  
43 This ‘nervous power’ was interpreted by medical physiologists of the time as an integral part of the nervous system 
of impulses modelled on the concept of the electrical circuit. 
44 In 1826, physiologist Johannes Mu¨ ller (1801–1858) published the theory of ‘specific nerve energies’, which 
suggested that sensory nerves could only interpret an impulse in one way. 
45 Erichsen, who had close links with France, may have been aware of the 1862 demonstration by Dr. Paul Broca 
(1824–1880) of the relationship between a brain lesion and motor aphasia (aphe´mie). However, he does not refer to 
Broca in On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System (1866). 
 
D. Mendelson / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 25 (2002) 303–329 312 
 
centres, there was a tendency to explain nervous disorders, which resulted in the loss of function 
in terms of physical malfunction of the nervous system by reference to the spine alone.46 
Moreover, when medical practitioners of the 1860s referred to any kind of ‘functional nervous 
disorders’ they meant literally a loss or impairment of function, usually the result of a 
physiological disease or disorder of the nervous system, but not its structure.47 
This understanding of nervous disorders also explains why some of the main proponents and 
opponents of Erichsen’s views were surgeons.48  
 
Originally, the term ‘nervous shock’ referred to a physical shock to the nervous system, as it was 
then understood.49 This meant that no matter how cognitively disabling or psychologically bizarre 
the secondary symptoms might be, the focus on the spine as the cause of nervous shock precluded 
the diagnosis of ‘insanity’ or ‘mental alienation’ in the assessment of railway accident victims. 
For although in the 1860s ‘insanity’ or ‘mental alienation’ were regarded as organic diseases, 
they were taken to be ‘diseases of the mind’.50 Since the Cartesian doctrine of mind and body 
dualism51 was still strong,52 diseases of the mind were considered separate from nervous disorders 
that may follow physical malfunctions of the spine. Baron Ernst von Feuchtersleben’s theory that 
psychic and somatic disorders were aspects of the same reality was translated into English in 
1847, but did not find wide acceptance at the time. Russell Reynolds’ seminal ‘Remarks on 
Paralysis and Other Disorders of Motion and Sensation, Dependent on Idea’,53 in which he 
demonstrated that patients could develop an illness that corresponded to their idea of physical 
disturbance, was yet to be published. In a way, surgeons and physicians who tried to understand 
and treat 
 
46 J. Oppenheim, ‘Shattered Nerves’: Doctors, Patients, and Depression in Victorian England, New York: Oxford 
University Press (1991), at 79–82. 
47 See, for example, C. Handfield Jones, ‘Pathology and Treatment of Functional Nervous Disorders’, The Lancet, 6 
July 1867, pp. 6–9. 
48 Likewise, the available data show that between 1826 and 1843, surgeons appeared as expert witnesses in 66% of 
criminal trials in which insanity was in issue. Physicians participated in 22% of such trials. J.P. Eigen and G. Andoll 
‘From Mad-Doctors to Forensic Witness: the Evolution of Early English Court Psychiatry’ (1986) 9 International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 159–169, at 165. 
49 Marshall Hall (1790–1857) is credited with coining the term ‘spinal shock’ in 1850. William Cox in ‘Case of 
Excessive Nervous Shock Following Delivery’ (1853) 1 The Lancet 556–7 described the collapse of a patient following 
a relatively easy/uneventful labour of a healthy 24-year-old woman. Cox noted that the source of the condition 
(‘exhaustion of the nervous centres’) was ‘purely physical, not psychical’. Id., at 557. 
50 E.T. Carlson and N. Dain, ‘The Meaning of Moral Insanity’ (1962) 36 Bulletin of the History of Medicine 130–40. 
51 The publication in 1858 by Rudolf Virchow of Cellular Pathology Based on Physiological and Pathological 
Histology (Die Cellular—pathologie in ihrer Begrundung auf physiologische und pathologische Gewebelehre), in 
which he advanced scientific arguments to challenge the Cartesian mind–body dualism would eventually lead to the 
most profound transformation in medical weltanschauung. But at the time, Virchow’s psychological insight into the 
nature of illness did not receive much attention from medical practitioners. 
52 E. von Feuchtersleben, The Principles of Medical Psychology (1845), H.E. Lloyd (Trans.), London: Sydenham 
Society (1847). 
53 R. Reynolds, ‘Remarks on Paralysis and Other Disorders of Motion and Sensation, Dependent on Idea’ (1869) 
British Medical Journal 483–85. 
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these ‘nervous’ disorders were not only precursors of modern neurology but also of 
psychosomatic psychiatry.54 
 
It was only in the late 1870s and, in particular, in the 1880s that a distinction was drawn between 
symptoms that had ‘organic’, that is physical, cause, and ‘functional’ disorders where there was 
no organic explanation for the disturbance of or inability to carry out previously normal 
activities.55 The aetiology of the latter conditions or illnesses would eventually be ascribed to 
purely mental trauma. However, in the early 1860s, those archetypal signposts of modern 
psychiatry—‘neurosis’ and ‘neurasthenia’—were still unknown.56 Medical terminology of the 
mid-19th century period suggests that while medicine did not regard a strictly neurophysiological 
model of human homeostasis as entirely adequate, systematic scientific endeavour to 
conceptualise the interrelation between mind and body and its psychosomatic manifestations was 
yet to begin. 
 
Relying on the then current understanding of neurology and anatomy, Erichsen argued that the 
‘secondary symptoms’ suffered by many of the victims of railway collisions were due to ‘twists 
and wrenches of the spine’. According to Erichsen: 
In Railway Collisions, when a person is violently and suddenly jolted from one side of the carriage 
to the other, the head is frequently forcibly thrown forwards and backwards, moving as it were by 
its own weight, the patient having momentarily lost control over the muscular structures of the 
neck.57 
He theorised that a relatively minor physical injury that occurs in traumatic circumstances may 
lead to ‘concussion from railway shock’ resulting in pathologic changes to the spinal cord and the 
brain stem.58 Erichsen postulated that pathological changes could be attributed, amongst other 
possible causes, to an inflammation of the spinal cord through ‘vibratory jarring’ of the nervous 
system causing a ‘molecular derangement’. He noted that there existed a close connection 
between nonimpact environmental trauma and organic injury. While representing the frontiers of 
technology, the railways, with their big locomotives reaching the 
 
54 The first chair of psychiatry was established in Leipzig, Germany in 1811. However, until the 1870s, in Leipzig, 
Vienna, and Berlin, nonpsychiatrists occupied these chairs. F. Schiller, A Mobius Strip Fin de Siecle Neuropsychiatry 
and Paul Mo¨bius, Berkeley: University of California Press (1982). 
55 H. Page, Injuries of the Spine and Spinal Cord without Apparent Mechanical Lesion and Nervous Shock in Their 
Surgical and Medical Aspects, London: J & A Churchill (1883) (based on his doctoral dissertation of 1881). 
56 Beard claimed to have coined the word neurasthenia (nervous exhaustion), which he described as a ‘functional 
disease of the nervous system’ in 1868 when he presented a study of 30 cases before the New York Medical Journal 
Association. G.M. Beard, A Practical Guide on Nervous Exhaustion (Neurasthenia), London: H.K. Lewis (1890), at p. 
23. Some 30 years later, Erichsen would point this out in a Letter to the Editor of the Texas Sanitarian (1894), vol. 3, 
pp. 448–9; quoted in E.M. Caplan, ‘Trains, Brains, and Sprains: Railway Spine and the Origins of Psychoneuroses’ 
(1995) Bulletin of the History of Medicine, vol. 69, pp. 387–419, at 418–9.  
57 J.E. Erichsen, On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System, London: Walton & Maberly (1866), at 78. 
58 Id., at 64–77. Erichsen regarded labelling these symptoms as ‘railway spine’, absurd. Id., at 10. 
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then incredible speed of 20–30 mph, epitomised the new and inherently dangerous force of 
mechanical power: 
In no ordinary accident can the shock be so great as in those that occur on Railways. The rapidity 
of movement, the momentum of the person injured, the suddenness of its arrest, the helplessness 
of the sufferers, and the natural perturbation of mind that must disturb the bravest, are all 
circumstances that of necessity increase the severity of the resulting injury to the nervous system, 
and justly cause these cases to be considered as somewhat exceptional from ordinary accidents.59 
 
There were other medical practitioners who agreed with Erichsen’s analysis.60 In 1867, The 
Lancet61 commissioned Dr. Thomas Buzzard to analyse case histories provided by medical 
practitioners from all over the United Kingdom. Dr. Buzzard published his findings in a series of 
articles called ‘Cases of Injury from Railway Accidents; Their Influence upon the Nervous 
System and Results’.62 He observed that patients involved in railway collisions were often unable 
to say how and where they were hurt. Although some had bruises indicating blows, their 
symptoms ‘were referable to the effects of general concussion or shock’.63 Others, who claimed to 
have received a severe blow, presented with no perceptible trace of injury. Buzzard warned that 
complaints of such patients should not be dismissed. He provided an example of a healthy 27-
year-old woman who, as a result of a railway collision, was thrown forwards then backwards 
against the side of carriage in which she was travelling. She was ‘stunned’, and lay on the bank 
for some time. She was then sent, presumably by the railway company, on the rest of her journey, 
accompanied by a friend. When the injured woman arrived at her original destination some 15 
hours after the accident: 
[s]he seemed dazed, but managed to walk from the station to her home, about 400 yards. She then 
went up to the third story, sank upon the floor, and had to be lifted into bed; vomited, said her 
head was very bad, and she only wanted to sleep.64 
In the evening, the attending physician found her ‘greatly excited, wanting to get up, incoherent 
in talk, complaining that she saw the engine coming in at the window, and laughing hysterically’. 
She grew steadily worse, was treated by three medical attendants with 
 
59 Id., at 9. 
60 W. Camps, Railway Accidents and Collisions: Their Effects upon the Nervous System, London: H.K. Lewis (1866). 
61 Editorial, ‘The Railway Compensation Cases’, The Lancet, 10 March 1866, 262–3, at 263. 
61 Editorial, ‘The Railway Compensation Cases’, The Lancet, 10 March 1866, 262–3, at 263. 
62 T. Buzzard, ‘Cases of Injury from Railway Accidents; Their Influence upon the Nervous System, and Results’, The 
Lancet, 13 April 1867, pp. 391–2; 27 April 1867, pp. 453–6; 25 May 1867, pp. 509–10, 623–5. 
63 T. Buzzard, ‘Cases of Injury from Railway Accidents; Their Influence upon the Nervous System, and Results’, The 
Lancet, 27 April 1867, pp. 453–6, at 454. 
64 Ibid. 
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blisters and morphia, but died 29 days after the accident. Following the autopsy, the physicians 
concluded that the patient  
sank, not from direct surgical shock, limited by the expression ‘concussion’ of brain or cord, but 
from a general shake of the nervous system, associated with fright.65 
 
4. Malingerers or genuine victims of railway collisions? 
 
While Erichsen’s book on Railway Injuries was in the tradition of the 18th century measured 
scientific discourse,66 the reaction to his views was far from dispassionate or strictly medical. The 
debates were not doctrinal, for it was accepted that the railway injuries, if genuine, were of 
physical origin. Rather, the issue on which the opinions of medical experts diverged involved the 
medicosocial validity of the diagnosis relating to the adverse sequelae. The debates provide a 
classic example of the importance of contextual framing in relation to questions of medical 
aetiology.67 Erichsen framed the inquiry into the causes of adverse sequelae that may follow upon 
a relatively trivial physical impact in terms of the then current medical theory. His basic 
presumption was that the severe symptoms exacerbating the original railway injuries were due 
partly to physical causes such as concussion of the spine leading to the irritation or chronic 
inflammation of membranes of the spinal cord and partly to the emotional trauma, particularly 
fear and the feeling of helplessness, which accompanied a railway collision. 
 
His opponents framed the causal question in terms of sociolegal context. They asserted that his 
theory, while pertinent to a few ‘genuine cases’, could not be used as a general rule because the 
self-interest of many patients engaged in personal injury litigation led them to either exaggerate 
or to simulate the incapacitating symptoms in the hope of obtaining greater compensation.68 Thus, 
the editor of the British Medical Journal (BMJ),69 
 
65 Ibid. Another illustration provided by Buzzard was that of two persons in Liverpool who, while walking along the 
railway line, were struck by an engine moving at the rate of 7 mph. They were instantly killed. On examination, it was 
found that the skin on their bodies was almost unbroken, even though ‘their flesh and bones were smashed’. 
66 Exemplified in contributions to the Society of Physicians in London (1757), Medical Observations and Inquiries, 
William Johnston, London. 
67 See P. Greenberg, ‘The Cause of Disease and Illness: Medical Views and Uncertainties’, in I. Freckelton and D. 
Mendelson (Eds.), Causation in Law and Medicine, Ashgate Dartmouth (The International Library of Medicine, Ethics 
and Law Series) (2001), at 38–58. 
68 In 1595, J.B. Sylvaticus published a treatise on simulation. Since that time malingering or feigning of diseases 
became a great preoccupation of writers on medical jurisprudence, and the subject of frequent letters to medical and 
surgical journals. The work of Zacchiae Pauli (1584–1659), Qvaestiones Medico-Legales. In Quibus eae Materiae 
Medicae, quae Ad Legales Facultates Videntur Pertinere, Propununtur, Pertractantur, Resolvuntur (1621) was probably 
the most influential. Thodoric R. Beck cites at length from a later edition of Zacchias (Questionum Medico-Legalium, 
Francofurti at Maenum, 1688) in his Elements of Medical Jurisprudence, Albany: Websters & Skinners (1823), vol. 1, 
pp. 1–30. 
69 Editorial, British Medical Journal, 1 December 1866, at 612–13. 
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denounced Erichsen’s Railway Injuries book on the basis that the main difference between 
‘railway nervous injuries’ and other kinds of injuries turned on the legal aspect of the former: 
A man whose spine is concussed on a railway brings an action against the company, and does or 
does not get heavy damages. A man, who falls from an apple tree and concusses his spine, has—
worse luck for him—no railway to bring an action against. 
 
For Erichsen, the possibility of excessive litigation by people who suffered from what today is 
called psychogenic injury,70 following nonimpact trauma, was not a major issue. However, the 
discussion of compensable and noncompensable injuries among the medical profession of the 
time nearly always involved the question of whether patients claiming compensation were 
genuinely injured or malingerers. Professor Syme, who in 1867 attacked Erichsen’s book in The 
Lancet,71 wrote that: 
. . . any man who travels by railway may easily obtain a competency [sic] by stumbling on the 
platform after the door of his carriage has been opened by a servant of the company, but before the 
train has ceased to move. He has then merely to go to bed, call in a couple of sympathizing 
doctors, diligently peruse Mr. Erichsen’s lately published work on Railway Injuries, go into court 
on crutches, and give a doleful account of the distress experienced by his wife and children 
through his personal sufferings, which have resulted from the culpable negligence that allowed 
him to leave his seat prematurely. 
 
Also in 1867, Edwin Morris, another railway surgeon who was an enthusiastic supporter of the 
BMJ’s editor and an admirer of Professor Syme, published a little book,72 in which he attempted 
to refute Erichsen’s theories and thereby ‘assist in unravelling those intricate cases in which there 
is every reason to believe the symptoms are simulated, and at the same time to put medical men 
on their guard against such cases’.73 Morris quoted a letter from a certain Dr. Cooper, surgeon to 
the Great Western Railway Company, who asserted that ‘injuries to the spine, as promulgated in 
courts of law, are a very different disease to that taught in the schools of anatomy and physiology, 
and are always cured by golden blisters’.74 Morris himself declared that ‘shock to, and alleged 
injury to the nervous system . . . form a class of injuries which designing and unscrupulous 
people do not hesitate to take shelter under for the purpose of exacting, through legal or other 
channels, compensation for such simulated injuries’.75 
 
70 The term ‘psychogenic’ is used to indicate that certain life events have played an important role in the genesis of the 
person’s psychiatric disorder. 
71 J. Syme, ‘On Compensation for Railway Injuries’, The Lancet, 5 January 1867, 2–3, at 2. The article, which 
described cases that in his opinion involved malingering on the part of successful claimants, gave rise to vigorous 
correspondence in the Letters to the Editor column of 1867.  
72 E. Morris, A Practical Treatise on Shock after Surgical Operations and Injuries with Special Reference to Shock 
caused by Railway Accidents, London: Robert Hardwicke (1867). 
73 Id., at v–vi. 
74 Id., at 63. 
75 Ibid. 
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In his Lancet articles, Thomas Buzzard, MD indirectly alluded to observations by Syme and 
Morris that many symptoms relating to mental incapacity suffered by victims of railway 
collisions were ‘subjective’ and difficult to verify. While recognizing that complaints of changes 
from normal function and sensation were indeed subjective, Buzzard suggested that patients’ 
assertions could be tested ‘by the consistency of the alleged symptoms’ and the physician’s 
estimate of the patient’s veracity.76 He then challenged the allegation that recovery following 
settlement of a claim for damages provides incontrovertible proof that the patient must have been 
simulating or exaggerating the symptoms. Buzzard offered the following explanation: 
 
It happens not infrequently, that patients exhibiting psychical phenomena . . . improve very 
rapidly when the question of compensation has been decided; and it is often argued that this 
circumstance furnishes decisive proof that the alleged symptoms were factitious. This is doubtless 
sometimes the case; but I apprehend that quite as frequently the true explanation lies in the fact 
that the settlement of the claim at issue leaves the patient for the first time in a condition 
favourable to recovery. It is a fact that mental anxiety alone is often sufficient to give rise to these 
phenomena, where the condition of the nervous system is favourable to their production . . . It is 
scarcely reasonable, therefore, to look for much improvement in the condition of a patient who is 
placed in exactly the worst condition for recovery. He is perhaps attended by one or more medical 
men, who are constantly directing his attention to his symptoms; visited by others, who frequently 
do not hide their disbelief in his statements; and awaiting in trepidation the ordeal of an 
examination in a court of law, where his claim is likely to be stoutly contested. He is placed, 
indeed, under circumstances which medical advice would caution him to avoid, as directly tending 
to increase the nervous exhaustion from which he is suffering.77 
 
Like Erichsen, Buzzard discussed case reports—obtained from other physicians—of patients 
who, following railway accidents, suffered what would now be termed chronic psychiatric 
disorders even though they were never involved in litigation, or had their cases settled long 
before.78 
 
A legal system that practically presupposed that any passenger involved in a railway collision was 
physically injured whether such injury was demonstrable or not, and which left only the quantum 
of damages to be litigated, inevitably lent itself to abuse. Some plaintiffs, aided and abetted by 
their medical and legal advisers, exploited the system, but so did, as the Chief Justice Cockburn 
of the Queen’s Bench in the Acton’s case pointed out, some railway companies. Judging by the 
volume of case reports sent to Thomas Buzzard, most physicians accepted their patients’ words 
and symptoms in good faith irrespective of their involvement or otherwise in personal injury 
litigation. Few physicians may have 
 
76 T. Buzzard, ‘Cases of Injury from Railway Accidents; Their Influence upon the Nervous System, and Results’, The 
Lancet, 25 May 1867, at 623. 
77 Id., at 623–4. 
78 For an analysis of the present attitudes of the medical profession towards nonorganic illness, see G. Mendelson, 
‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder as Psychiatric Injury in Civil Litigation’ (1995) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, vol. 2, 
53–64. 
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encouraged their patients in the belief that they were suffering from an organic illness even in the 
absence of any signs to substantiate such diagnosis. At the same time, there was also a group of 
medical practitioners who adhered to a theory that patients involved in personal injury litigation 
were, until proven otherwise, malingerers,79 whose complaints were primarily motivated by the 
lure of pecuniary damages. Writing in 1881, but familiar with the medicolegal scene of the 1860s, 
Dr. Russell Reynolds would observe that: 
There are some members of our profession, who have become specialists in this direction 
[medico-legal practice], who seem to think that everything that a man tells them of his subjective 
symptoms are matters of fact and of great importance; and on the other hand, there are those who 
regard every plaintiff as either a knave or a fool, and most probably a combination of the two, but 
who never believe that any man is injured in a railway accident unless he has broken his neck, or 
has a compound fracture of his thigh.80 
The latter would invariably appear as expert witnesses for the defence. Thus, polarization of 
opinions on the nature of railway injuries became reflected in courts, where each party to 
litigation would consult or hire a sympathetic expert medical practitioner. 
 
5. Secondary symptoms of railway injuries and the function of medical witnesses in the 
1860s 
 
One of the many cases in which Professor Erichsen was called as an expert witness for the 
plaintiff, while Professor Syme testified for the defendant, was Denham v. the Great Northern 
Railway Company,81 which came before the Court of Common Pleas at Guildhall. In his Railway 
Injuries book, Erichsen provided a detailed background to Denham’s case. On 1 March 1865, Mr. 
D, a healthy, 33-year-old man was ‘thrown violently against the opposite side of the carriage, and 
then fell on the floor as a result of a train collision’.82 Two months later, the patient described his 
initial symptoms as 
a swelling the size of an egg over the sacrum, severe pain in the lower part of the spine, which, . . . 
had extended up the whole back and into the head, producing giddiness and dimness of sight. 
These, with tingling feelings in the limbs (particularly, the left), great pain in the back, and 
tenderness to the touch, sickness in the mornings, and lameness, continued for the first fortnight.83 
 
79 D. Mendelson, ‘The Expert Deposes but the Court Disposes: The Concept of Malingering and the Function of 
Medical Expert Witness in the Forensic Process’ (1995) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, vol. 18, 425–36. 
80 R. Reynolds, ‘Specialism in Medicine’, The Lancet (1881), vol. 11, 655–8, at 657. 
81 Denham v. the Great Northern Railway Company (unreported, December 1865, Court of Common Pleas at 
Guildhall). 
82 J.E. Erichsen, On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System, London: Walton & Maberly (1866), at 74. 
83 Ibid. 
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It appears that initially Mr. D did not see a doctor, but applied popular remedies of the time, such 
as blisters and hot fomentations to his spine. Although he seemed to improve, Mr. D consulted 
‘an eminent surgeon [Syme], who ordered him to go about as much as possible, but to avoid 
cold’. He followed this advice, but his symptoms ‘much increased, with prostration and 
lameness’.84 Indeed, when seen by Erichsen and a surgeon, Mr. Hewer, the patient presented with 
‘the most intense stutter’. His spine was rigid, and when touched lightly on the back, the patient 
would: 
Start forwards as if he had been touched with a red-hot iron . . . the muscles are thrown into 
violent contraction so as to become rigid, and to be raised in strong relief, their outlines becoming 
clearly defined.85 
Mr. D’s gait consisted of shuffling his legs sideways. He would alternate the action of the legs, 
but could not ‘bring one leg in front of the other without twisting the whole body and turning, as 
on a pivot, on the leg that supports him’.86 Not unlike medicolegal patients of today, Mr. D saw a 
whole battery of doctors on behalf of both parties. When the trial began in December 1865, the 
plaintiff called four expert witnesses, including Erichsen, Sir William Ferguson, and Russell 
Reynolds.87 They testified that he was suffering from ‘concussion of the spine’ and that his 
recovery was ‘uncertain’. Five expert witnesses for the defence, including Professor Syme and 
Dr. Dunsmure, the then president of the Edinburgh College of Surgeons, ‘expressed the 
conviction that there was no organic disease whatsoever, and no reason why the claimant should 
not enjoy good health’.88 The jury was not persuaded and awarded the plaintiff £4750 in damages. 
According to Erichsen, who remained Mr. D’s treating medical practitioner, 6 months after the 
trial, the patient’s condition was considerably improved in so far as he stammered ‘less 
vehemently’ and the sensibility of his back was lessened. However, he still had ‘considerable 
rigidity about the spine’, could walk only with an aid of a stick, and retained ‘that peculiar 
careworn, anxious and aged look that is so very characteristic of those who suffered from those 
injuries’.89 
 
In December 1867, commenting on cases such as Denham, The Lancet observed that 
[n]othing has a greater tendency in the public mind to weaken the confidence in Medicine as an 
exact science than the medical evidence given at trials for compensation for railway injuries.90 
 
84 Ibid. 
85 Id., at 75–6. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Dr. Reynolds wrote a Letter to the Editor critical of Syme’s letter about the Denham’s case. 
88 J. Syme, ‘Compensation for Railway Injuries’, The Lancet, 5 January 1867, 2–3, at 2. 
89 J.E. Erichsen, On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System, London: Walton & Maberly (1866), at 77. 
Erichsen’s treatment consisted of recommendation for: ‘perfect rest, lying on a Prone couch; . . . warm saltwater 
douches to the spine, for which purpose he has resided at Brighton, and . . . full doses of thioamide of potassium. 
90 Anonymous, ‘Medical Evidence in Railway Injuries’, The Lancet, 14 December 1867, at 741. 
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The commentator was particularly critical of contradictory testimony adduced on the part of the 
plaintiff and defendant by medical experts of equal standing and eminence in the profession: 
The witnesses on the side of the plaintiff invariably regarded the injuries sustained as of a very 
serious character; whilst the witnesses for the defendant as invariably appeared to regard them as 
far less important, and less permanent in their effects.91 
 
Having noted that ‘trials of this kind rarely involve any important question of law, the railway 
directors usually admitting liability’, the commentator called for parliamentary intervention to 
establish a medical tribunal for the purposes of settling the questions of injury and compensation 
in such cases: 
Two or three competent [medical] practitioners appointed by Government as arbitrators would be 
able to satisfactorily test the evidence of medical witnesses, and arrive, in almost every instance, . 
. . at a fair conclusion on the matter at issue.92 
Some 18 months earlier, another Lancet editorial titled on ‘Railway Compensation Cases’93 
floated a similar idea. The editorial writer defined the role of medical witnesses in railway 
compensation trials as 
a scientific body, . . . invested with a duty which embraces the interests of the general public, 
including railway shareholders, as well as of those members of the community who allege injury 
from the accident. 
It was possibly the failure to totally repudiate the acceptability of the practice of ‘medical 
arbitration’ that led to a misunderstanding of the role of medical experts in civil litigation. The 
proposed role for medical witnesses was akin to the institution of court assessors who were 
appointed by the Admiralty and Patent Courts to act as coadjudicators.94 However, although the 
tradition of nautical and patent court assessors went back to the 14th century, their adjudicative 
role began to be questioned in the middle of the 19th century.95 Unlike the expert court assessors, 
the function of the expert medical witness in injury compensation proceedings was not to 
determine matters at issue, but to assist the court with information within the area of his or her 
expertise. This would have included an assessment of the injured plaintiff’s impairment, that is, 
‘any loss or abnormality of psychological, physiological, or anatomical structure or function’.96 
The function of the court was to assess the plaintiff’s disability, in the sense of the deleterious 
consequences and effects resulting from impairment on his or her 
 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Editorial, ‘The Railway Compensation Cases’, The Lancet, 10 March 1866, 262–3, at 262. 
94 See A. Dickie, ‘The Province and Function of Assessors in English Courts’ (1970) 33 Modern Law Review 494. 
95 The Ann and Mary (1843) 2 Wm & Rob 189, 166 ER 725; The Beryl (1884) 9 PD 4, at 137. For a discussion, see 
C.A. Jones, Expert Witnesses; Science, Medicine and the Practice of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1994), at 38–55. 
96 World Health Organisation, International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities, and Handicaps, Geneva: World 
Health Organisation (1980). 
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ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for human 
beings.97 In its determination, the court had to consider not only medical opinions regarding 
diagnosis and prognosis, but also the degree of the plaintiff’s capacity to obtain employment, the 
nature of future employment, the level of remuneration, the vagaries of inflation, other positive 
and negative contingencies, as well as questions of normative standards and deterrence. In other 
words, the determination of disability would involve a review not only of medical factors, but 
also of legal, social, and financial considerations. Therefore, whereas it is appropriate for medical 
expert witnesses or medical panels to provide opinion on questions relating to the nature of injury 
and assess the patient’s impairment, the assessment of damages has been, invariably, the function 
of the courts. Not surprisingly, the legislature ignored The Lancet’s proposal for expert medical 
witnesses acting as arbitrators. 
 
6. An epistolary controversy regarding the case of a commercial traveller 
 
Perhaps the most vigorous intraprofessional debate on the nature of railway injuries with no 
physical lesions was triggered in 1867 by the publication by The Lancet of Professor Syme’s 
medicolegal case report titled ‘Compensation for Railway Injuries’.98 The report elicited a 
response from Dr. Patrick Heron Watson.99 The case involved a compensation claim for ‘a severe 
wrench of the spine’. 
 
It seems that neither the law of defamation100 nor the disciplinary powers of the British General 
Medical Council101 operated to prevent medical practitioners of the time from expressing robust 
opinions about motives and conduct of their colleagues. The two documents provide a fascinating 
insight into clinical and medicolegal practice of the mid-19th century, when ‘nervous disease was 
but little understood’.102 They also illustrate how a commitment to a particular medical approach 
and theory may affect doctors’ perceptions of events and patients. 
Professor Syme wrote that, on 27 April 1865, he saw a commercial traveller who told him that he 
was ‘shaken’ when the train on the Great Northern Railway Company line of which he 
 
97 Ibid. 
98 J. Syme, ‘Compensation for Railway Injuries’, The Lancet, 5 January 1867, pp. 2–3. 
99 P.H. Watson, ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Lancet, 2 February 1867, pp. 159–60. 
100 For example, in Hunter v. Sharpe (unreported, the Court of Queen’s Bench, 20 November 1866), a libel case 
involving assertions about medical qualifications against a newspaper, the jury awarded the plaintiff a farthing in 
damages. 
101 The General Council of Medical Education and Registration of the United Kingdom (GMC) was established by 
Medical Act 1858, 21 and 22 Vict c 90. Although it had the power to find registered medical practitioners guilty of 
‘infamous conduct in a professional respect’ for depreciation of colleagues, no investigations into such conduct were 
undertaken prior to 1883. Yet, complaints with regard to this matter were received on 3 March 1864, III, p. 398; 25 
February 1868, VI, p. 306; 5 July 1869, VII, p. 46; 6 July 1969, VII, pp. 49–50; R. Smith, ‘Legal Precedent and 
Medical Ethics’, in R. Baker (Ed.), The Codification of Medical Morality, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 
(1995). 
102 P. Bailey, Accident and Injury; Their Relations to Diseases of the Nervous System, New York: D. Appleton & Co. 
(1898), at 187. 
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was a passenger collided with another. According to Syme, following the collision the man 
walked a mile and a half to see Dr. Maclagan, who assured him that there was no local injury or 
occasion for complaint.103 Nevertheless, on the following day, the patient went to Edinburgh, to 
consult Syme. The surgeon found no ‘local complaint’, but asked the patient to come back. At a 
subsequent consultation, Syme observed that the patient ‘[exhibited] the most perfect freedom in 
all his movements, without any sign of local injury’. Syme told the patient that ‘if he felt any 
uneasiness, it must be more mental than bodily’.104 But: 
On the same day, the 28th of April, it appears that this person, having procured an accomplished 
agent, applied to a surgeon of experience in cases like his own, who discovered that he sustained a 
‘severe wrench of the spine and sacroiliac synchondrosis’ put him to bed, called in a trustworthy 
coadjutor, and visited his interesting patient at least once a day for months. On the 12th of June 
Dr. Dunsmure [an employee medical officer of the Great Northern Railway Company] requested 
me to see the claimant, as he had now become.We found him lying upon a sofa, from which he 
rose and walked with vigour and flexibility of body. There was not the slightest swelling, 
discoloration, or rigidity of the spine, and, on the contrary, every appearance of good health so far 
as we could judge from our own observations.105 
 
The nature of the relationship between the commercial traveller and Professor Syme changed 
over time from one of a treating doctor and a patient to that of a medicolegal assessor and a 
claimant. However, the shift in the patient’s status probably did not influence the surgeon’s 
professional practice. Syme’s medical approach to diagnosis was to look for objective signs. 
Without denying the possibility of injury by way of ‘a severe wrench of the spine’, Syme 
eliminated such diagnosis in this case on the basis that the patient did not have any bruises or 
lesions and his apparent mobility militated against the presence of an internal injury. Hence, the 
initial observation that the patient’s complaint was ‘more mental than bodily’. Nevertheless, 
Syme’s recommendation that the patient apply hot fomentation106 suggests that he did not ignore 
the possibility of an organic damage. Hot fomentation was regarded as particularly beneficial and 
curative when applied ‘in the very early stages of acute inflammation, especially of the serous 
membranes’.107 Fomentations were also applied to relieve pain, so it is possible that the patient 
may have complained of some physical discomfort as well as ‘mental uneasiness’. 
 
In July, Dr. Watson, who was treating the plaintiff, obtained the certificate on ‘soul and 
conscience’108 that cross-examination in court would be detrimental to his patient’s health. 
Professor Syme and Dr. Dunsmure were requested by the defendant company109 to provide 
 
103 J. Syme, ‘Compensation for Railway Injuries’, The Lancet, 5 January 1867, at 2. 
104 Id., at 3. 
105 Ibid. 
106 P.H. Watson, ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Lancet, 2 February 1867, at 159. 
107 G. Johnson, ‘Treatment of Inflammation’, The Lancet, 22 December 1866, pp. 683–88, at 688. Serous membranes 
are a delicate membrane covered with flat, mesothelial cells lining closed cavities of the body. 
108 Syme seems to have been unaware that the certificate on ‘soul and conscience’ was the legal formula used in 
Scottish courts of the time. 
109 In his article, Syme claimed that the request for the report came from the court, but this is clearly incorrect. 
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another report. Syme again focused on the patient’s mobility as the major criterion of good 
health.110 He and Dunsmure found: 
the claimant lying, or rather lolling, on two chairs in a garden, to and from which he walked in 
leaving and returning to his room, which was up a stair on the drawing-room floor. He told us that 
he sat at his meals, and, on the whole, he had no appearance whatever of bad health. 
 
Although they reported that the trial for damages against the railway company could proceed 
immediately, the plaintiff’s request for deferral was granted. The plaintiff initially sued the 
railway company for £3000, however, at the trial, which took place in December, his counsel 
agreed to accept £1000 in damages.111 The sum of £1000 was twice the average amount of 
compensation awarded for railway injuries by the courts in the mid-1860s.112 In his article, Syme 
reasoned that no one ‘who had sustained a severe wrench of the spine and sacro-iliac 
synchondrosis [could] immediately afterwards walk a mile and a half, or on two following days 
travel sixty miles by railway, drive about in cabs, and make visits without local complaint’.113 Dr. 
Patrick Heron Watson, to whom Syme derogatively referred as a ‘surgeon of experience in such 
cases’,114 provided a rather different version of events. Watson wrote that on 28 April 1866, he 
was requested to visit the commercial traveller at his hotel. The patient, who was lying upon a 
couch, told him that when the collision occurred he was not only shaken, but also thrown 
violently backwards, and, ‘on recovering his senses found himself lying on the floor of the 
carriage’. He eventually took an omnibus and then walked half a mile to see Dr. Maclagan. 
Contrary to Syme’s statements that Dr. Maclagan found ‘no local injury or occasion for 
confinement’, Maclagan wrote in his report to court that: 
It seemed to me that [the patient] . . . thought the risk was over, but that was not my opinion. I 
recommended him to take complete rest for some days. As a physician I should certainly say that a 
person receiving a shock such as Mr. . . . did would not feel the effects of it immediately so much 
as he would do some days after the shock, and that was my reason for recommending perfect rest 
for a time.115 
Notwithstanding this medical advice, the patient went to Edinburgh, where, on his hotelkeeper’s 
advice, he consulted Mr. Syme. Under oath, the plaintiff testified that ‘Mr. Syme requested me to 
return home and foment my back with flannel and hot water, and that  
 
110 This focus was probably not incidental, for in 1842 he introduced an amputation at the ankle, still known as Syme’s 
amputation. 
111 J. Syme, ‘Compensation for Railway Injuries’, The Lancet, 5 January 1867, at 3. 
112 For example, according to an anonymous article ‘Actions against Railway Companies’, 43 The Law Times, 27 July 
1867, at 205, 45 successful legal actions brought against railway companies were reported during the first 6 months of 
1867. The railway companies were ordered to pay damages totaling £24,825 in 29 of these actions. Most awards 
involved relatively small sums; however, one plaintiff was awarded a very large sum of £7000 ‘on the assumption that 
he was irrevocably injured, a portion of that sum to be paid down, and a portion to be reserved until the sufferer’s 
condition should be finally decided’. 
113 J. Syme, ‘Compensation for Railway Injuries’, The Lancet, 5 January 1867, at 3. 
114 P.H. Watson, ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Lancet, 2 February 1867, at 159–60. 
115 Id., at 159. 
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in few days I would know what was the matter’.116 In his reply to Syme, and giving as good as he 
got, Watson commented that: 
Dissatisfied with the superficial, and, as he thought, careless examination of his case by Mr. Syme, 
the patient sent immediately for me, not by the advice of his law agent, as Mr. Syme would have 
it, but as he stated to me, in pursuance of his original intention on coming to Edinburgh.117 
 
Syme also questioned whether a ‘serious disease of the spine resulting from external violence 
[could] exist for eight months without presenting some sign of its presence in the patient’s gait, 
flexibility of trunk, or general appearance’.118 Watson’s clinical approach was to look for 
semiobjective as well as objective signs. His physical examination of the patient revealed no 
bruises on the body, but he observed that the patient experienced throbbing pain in the head, 
which ‘increased on motion of the head or body, and upon firm closure of the jaws’.119 The 
following part of Dr. Watson’s report is worth quoting as an example of a conscientious medical 
examination. It is also clear that Watson was greatly influenced by Erichsen’s theories. The 
physician observed that the patient: 
also complained of giddiness and nausea on changing his position, and of pain, on pressure, just 
below the occiput. . . . He moved stiffly as one mass in rising from the recumbent or sitting 
posture and on walking, and complained of pain in his loins. On stooping in the sitting position he 
bent his dorsal and cervical vertebrae, but kept his lumbar spine rigid, and rested with his hands on 
his knees. In walking he carried his superincumbent weight rigidly, and kept his arms fixed close 
by his sides. In standing he supported his weight equally on both feet, and could not bear to stand 
on one limb or to hop. On examining the lumbar region, where he complained of pain, I found no 
change in the line of lumbar spine, nor pain in the lumbar muscles, but marked pain on pressure 
over all the spinous processes of the lumbar vertebrae, especially the third, and along the line of 
both, but especially the right, sacro-iliac synchondrosis. In every mode of examination, the pain 
was persistently referred to the same parts.120 
 
Whether or not he ordered fomentation to alleviate pain, Professor Syme—who was among the 
pioneers in the surgical use of chloroform in Britain—did not seem to have been seriously 
concerned with the patient’s pain. In contrast, Dr. Watson focused primarily on the pain the 
patient experienced when moving. He put the patient ‘under careful treatment’, which however, 
was not successful. In May, Dr. Watson asked Professor Spence to visit the patient. They both 
concluded that the patient suffered ‘a severe wrench of the spine and sacroiliac synchondrosis’.121 
As a result of their report, the railway company sent its own medical 
 
116 Ibid. 
117 P.H. Watson, ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Lancet, 2 February 1867, at 160. 
118 J. Syme, ‘Compensation for Railway Injuries’, The Lancet, 5 January 1867, at 3. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. 
121 The term ‘sacro-iliac synchondrosis’ probably refers to an inflammatory disease or infection of sacroiliac 
articulation of joints in which the surfaces are connected by a plate of cartilage. In the past, the phrase sacroiliac disease 
was used to denote chronic tuberculous infection of the joint. 
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officer, Dr. Dunsmure (who, like Syme, appeared for the defence in the Denham’s case) to see the 
plaintiff in June. According to the plaintiff’s affidavit: 
When Dr. Dunsmure first saw me he told me that I got a severe knock on the back, and that the 
muscles of the back were injured, and that I would in future require to be careful, as I would 
always be subject to rheumatism in the injured part of the back. . . . He also said that my nervous 
system received a shock.122 
 
Dr. Dunsmure and Professor Syme went to see the plaintiff at home, but did not physically 
examine him before writing the July report on behalf of the railway company. Sometime before, 
Watson sent the plaintiff to Portobello for medicinal water treatment. This therapy also failed to 
relieve the constant pain. Dr. Watson then resorted to the remedy of blistering the tissue in hope 
that this kind of ‘counter-irritation’ would alleviate the distressing symptoms.123 It was at this 
stage, that the physician successfully asked the court to postpone the trial. In September, the 
patient’s condition deteriorated. Their treatment suggests that Watson and Spence attributed their 
patient’s condition to an inflammatory disease, because they applied such standard anti-
inflammatory remedies as the Corrigan cautery to his back, gave him iodide of potassium to 
swallow,124 and ordered complete rest.125 When the patient’s ‘spinal symptoms’ improved, the 
doctors recommended ‘the use of salt water douche bath at a neighbouring bathing 
establishment’.126 
 
In December, in anticipation of the trial, Watson127 and Spence again carried out a thorough 
physical examination of the patient. At the end of his letter, Dr. Watson pointed out that despite 
Professor Syme’s prediction, the settlement of the case by the plaintiff did not lead to speedy 
recovery. Some 2 months after the trial, he was still ‘obliged to continue the same repose and to 
maintain persistent counter-irritation by means of blistering tissue to relieve himself of pain’.128 
 
122 P.H. Watson, ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Lancet, 2 February 1867, at 160. 
123 This regimen, undertaken here as treatment of last resort, was consistent with the humoral theory of medicine. 
Blistering (together with sinapisms, turpentine, ammonia, croton oil, tartar emetic, setons, and moxa) was regarded as a 
local remedy for later stages of inflammation. The application of the blisters irritated the ‘serous membrane beneath’ 
and acted as ‘counter-irritation’ or ‘revulsion’—diverting ‘the blood from the seat of the disease to the surface’. G. 
Johnson, ‘Treatment of Inflammation’, The Lancet, 22 December 1866, pp. 683–88, at 688. 
124 Iodide of potassium, when administered in full doses of 10–15 grains a day, was regarded as ‘curative in some cases 
of inflammation of the bones and periosteum’. G. Johnson, ‘Treatment of Inflammation’, The Lancet, 22 December 
1866, pp. 683–88, at 687. 
125 According to G. Johnson, ‘Treatment of Inflammation’, The Lancet, 22 December 1866, pp. 683–88, at 684, ‘In all 
cases of serious inflammation rest in bed forms an important part of the treatment. Muscular exertion quickens and 
excites the heart’s movements, and so increases pain and throbbing in the inflamed part’.  
126 P.H. Watson, ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Lancet, 2 February 1867, at 160. 
127 Watson also experimented with taking the patient’s temperature and checking the ‘sensibility and muscular 
contractibility of the extremities’. He found ‘a persistent difference of five degrees, a marked difference by the compass 
test in the sensibility and a manife    st want of muscular irritability in the right limb as compared with the left’. P.H. 
Watson, ‘Letter to the Editor’, The Lancet, 2 February 1867, at 160. 
128 Ibid. 
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The diagnosis by Dr. Watson and Professor Spence of ‘severe wrench of the spine’ was based on 
epistemology provided by Erichsen’s work. In the 1860s, knowledge of the nervous system, and 
neurology in general, was still in its infancy. Neither Erichsen nor Syme had the scientific 
methodology that would enable them to test whether these symptoms were of ‘cerebral’ (that is, 
psychological) or spinal (physical) origin. Syme’s opinion that the complaint was ‘more mental 
than bodily’ suggests that he suspected the presence of psychogenic factors. However, medical 
practitioners who adhered strictly to the theory of Cartesian dualism would have considered such 
conditions outside the purview of medicine. Indeed, in 1867 medical understanding of psychiatric 
injury was not yet sufficiently advanced for either Syme or Watson to diagnose that the patient’s 
condition was due to, or complicated by, a neurotic disorder. Yet Watson, possibly as a result of 
his interest in Erichsen’s work, showed an insight into such conditions by recommending 
treatment that in the 1890s would become one of preference in the management of neurasthenia 
and hysteria.129 
 
In the course of legal proceedings, Syme’s view that the patient’s complaint was mental rather 
than physical, lent itself to an argument that in the absence of a diagnosable medical injury no 
compensation should be awarded. Watson’s diagnosis of an organic injury was supportive of the 
plaintiff’s claim. 
 
7. Nervous shock in the court 
 
Erichsen’s book focused on psychosomatic sequelae of traumatic events, a condition that hitherto 
attracted minimal attention from medicine.130 In the 1860s, those doctors who accepted the 
existence of the Erichsenian ‘secondary symptoms’ ascribed their aetiology to meningomyeliltis 
of the spinal cord and the brain, which, though not physically apparent, was organic in nature. 
The ‘secondary symptoms’ themselves were given by medicine the collective appellation of 
‘nervous shock’.131 The judiciary accepted this medical theory and treated claims for ‘nervous 
shock’ by railway passengers as they would any other physical injury that was shown to be a 
consequence of a tortious act. 
 
129 P. Bailey, Accident and Injury; Their Relations to Diseases of the Nervous System, New York: D. Appleton & Co. 
(1898), at 409, wrote that ‘the douche excels all other hydriatric measures in the constitutional treatment of 
neurasthenia and hysteria’. 
130 A year earlier, George Burr described the condition that came to be known as ‘shell-shock’ in ‘Cases of Injuries of 
Nervous Centres, from Explosion of Shells without Wound of Contusion’ (1865) 1 New York Medical Journal 428–32. 
131 The term ‘nervous shock’ was used already in the 1860s, however, Erichsen who is associated with this term as 
denoting severe symptoms which some patients developed following physically threatening circumstances, he did not 
use it in the first edition of his book On Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System, London: Walton & 
Maberly. He appears to have used this term for the first time in print in 1875, see J.E. Erichsen, On the Concussion of 
the Spine, Nervous Shock and Other Obscure Injuries of the Nervous System, New York: William Wood & Co. (1875); 
J.E. Erichsen, On Concussion of the Spine: Nervous Shock and Other Obscure Injuries of the Nervous System in their 
Clinical and Medico-Legal Aspects, London: Longmans, Green & Co. (1875). 
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However, in the early 1880s, the notion that nervous symptoms132 ‘were due to lesion in that part 
of the central nervous system which has its seat in the spinal column’133 was challenged by 
Herbert Page, who wrote that: 
most of the strange nervous symptoms so commonly seen after railway accidents . . . were more 
or less immediate concomitants of the profound mental emotion aroused by the unquestionably 
special features of every collision.134 
 
According to Page, these symptoms, though serious, usually had a transient effect upon the 
nervous system.135 Indeed, from the 1870s until the end of the 19th century and beyond, medicine 
began to reconceptualise the symptomatology and aetiology of nervous shock in terms of 
hysteria, traumatic psychoneurosis, and other psychiatric conditions. Correspondingly, the 
lawyers of the time proceeded to distinguish between two kinds of personal harm for the purposes 
of compensation: physical or ‘organic’ injury on the one hand, and ‘mental’ or emotional injury 
on the other. Adapting the ‘organic’ theory, Thomas Beven, in his Principles of the Law of 
Negligence,136 explained that ‘where nervous shock is produced, the terror is merely another 
expression for a direct effect on the nervous system—a portion of physical organisation’.137 In 
contrast, the term ‘mental shock’ was taken by lawyers to refer to such painful but transient 
emotional experiences as anxiety, anguish, or grief that—it was then thought—were not 
productive of any appreciable injury to the organism. Recovery would be allowed for ‘nervous 
shock’, but not for ‘mental shock’,138 unless the latter followed upon the former. These fine 
distinctions were bound to create confusion. 
 
The medically controversial nature of nervous symptoms that did not follow on physically 
demonstrable injury became the basis for denial of liability by the railway companies. While 
admitting negligence in causing the accident, they would deny liability on the grounds that such 
controversial condition as ‘nervous shock’ could not be regarded as a reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of negligent conduct.139 
 
132 In the 1870s, William Cullen’s medical nosology was drastically modified, with neurosis confined to a much 
narrower category of ‘nervous’, meaning emotional disorders. 
133 H. Page, Railway Injuries with Special Reference to Those of the Back and Nervous System in Their Medico-Legal 
and Clinical Aspects, Philadelphia: P Blakiston, Son & Co. (1891), at ix. See also R.M. Hodges, ‘So-Called 
Concussion of the Spinal Cord’ (1881) 104 Boston Medical and Surgical Journal 388. 
134 H. Page, Railway Injuries with Special Reference to those of the Back and Nervous System in their Medico-Legal 
and Clinical Aspects, Philadelphia: P. Blakiston, Son & Co. (1891), at viii. 
135 Ibid. 
137 Id., at 67. 
138 In the case of Armsworth v. South-Eastern Railway Company (1847) 11 Jur 758, at 760, Parke B. stated that unless 
accompanied by actual physical injury, emotional damage in the form of mere grief, sorrow, anguish, fear, or anxiety 
does not sound in damages when occasioned by negligent conduct. Coleridge J. further elaborated the refusal of 
compensation for negligently occasioned emotional harm in Blake v. Midland Railway Company (1852) 21 LJ QB 233. 
136 T. Beven, Principles of the Law of Negligence, London: Stevens and Haynes (1889). 
139 The reasoning regarding remoteness of damage was analogous to that in Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341; 156 
ER 145. 
 
D. Mendelson / International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 25 (2002) 303–329, 328 
 
This line of argument was presented in Coultas v. Victorian Railway Commissioners,140 the first 
reported case on compensability of nervous shock. In this case, a gatekeeper, employed by the 
Victorian Railways Commissioners, carelessly ushered the buggy driven by Mrs. Coultas’ 
husband across the railway crossing. Just as they had passed over one set of rails, a train came 
past. Frightened by its approach, Mary Coultas fainted. Shortly afterwards she suffered a 
miscarriage and was ill for several months. Medical evidence at the subsequent court hearing 
indicated that she had suffered a ‘severe nervous shock from the fright, and that the illness from 
which she afterwards suffered was the consequence of the fright’. The Supreme Court of Victoria 
held that Mrs. Coultas could recover for mental and physical injuries resulting from nervous 
shock caused by the defendants’ negligent conduct. However, on appeal from Australia, the Privy 
Council advised that: 
Damage arising from mere sudden terror unaccompanied by any actual physical injury, but 
occasioning a nervous or mental shock, cannot . . . be considered a consequence which, in the 
ordinary course of things, would flow from the negligence of the gate-keeper.141 
 
The Privy Council equated mental (in the sense of a ‘purely emotional’ occurrence) with nervous 
shock (in the sense of an actual physical or organic injury). The legal outcome of this mistaken—
in terms of the then current medical theory—identification of nervous with mental shock142 was 
the denial of recovery for both. The Judicial Committee refused to allow damages for negligently 
caused nervous shock not accompanied by physical impact on the grounds that if such recovery 
were granted: 
Not only in such a case as the present, but in every case where an accident caused by negligence 
had given a person a serious nervous shock, there might be a claim for damages on account of 
mental injury. The difficulty which now exists in case of alleged physical injuries of determining 
whether they were caused by the negligent act would be greatly increased, and a wide field opened 
for imaginary claims.143 
 
The reference to causal uncertainty and fear of ‘imaginary claims’, suggests that the Committee’s 
approach was influenced by more than purely theoretical controversies about the nature and 
medical status of nervous shock.144 The phrase ‘imaginary claims’ encapsulates the language used 
by some medical practitioners to describe patients presenting with ‘nervous shock’ both outside 
and inside the court. 
The debates of the 1860s were instrumental in shaping the perception of psychosomatic sequelae 
of accidents that do not result in demonstrable lesions as medically and legally suspect. Erichsen 
thought that although there would be cases of fraud and exaggeration of 
 
13(6) The Journal of the American Medical Association 181–8. 
140 Coultas et uxor v. The Victorian Railway Commissioners (1886) 12 VLR 895. 
141 Victorian Railways Commissioners v. James Coultas and Mary Coultas [1888] 13 AC 222, at 224. 
142 The Privy Council’s decision was trenchantly criticised. See T. Beven, Principles of the Law of Negligence, 
London: Stevens and Haynes (1889), at 67–8; Case Note, ‘Is Negligence Causing Nervous Shock?’, The Law Journal, 
21 July 1888, 390–1. 
143 Id., at 226–7. 
144 For a contemporary critical analysis, see H.H. Smith, ‘Concussion of the Spine in Its Medico-Legal Aspects’ (1889) 
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symptoms, the majority of patients who presented with nonphysical injuries were genuine. His 
opponents presented precisely the opposite view, arguing that save for few genuine exceptions, 
severe symptoms, which some patients developed following physically threatening 
circumstances, were factitious. In their arguments, they created a plethora of pejorative 
phraseology, including such terms as ‘litigation symptoms’ ‘railway spine’, ‘golden blisters’, and 
‘malingering’. With the development of psychologically oriented theory of neurosis in the 1870s 
and 1880s, such phrases as ‘railway brain’,145 ‘litigation neurosis’, and ‘compensation neurosis’ 
entered the medical vocabulary. Medical practitioners would use these phrases in their clinical 
practice and court reports as if they formed a part of medical nosology. Yet, without denying the 
existence of fraudulent claims and factitious disorders, it would have been possible to assess such 
claims in scientific and value-neutral terms. The disparaging terminology adopted by many 
physicians and surgeons146 reflected polarisation of medical views and attitudes, which, in turn, 
found expression on the witness stand. Those medical practitioners who ignored the principle of 
scientific impartiality of an expert witness advocated by Thomas Percival in his Medical Ethics 
advanced neither the cause of medicine nor the law. 
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